A Citizen's Duties

    If there was any single term that could serve as a "watchword" for Stoic values, it would have been the word "duty."  Stoic writers and teachers used it constantly, albeit in different contexts.  Since here in the United States we are coming up on a presidential election, it would certainly be appropriate to discuss this matter: Is there a "duty" for the Stoic to take part in such elections?  We live in a free Republic, and one of the aspects of that circumstance is the fact that we can participate in choosing who our executives and legislators will be, and how long they will serve--at least within the law.  We do not required citizens to vote, unlike some nations, and voter turnout is sometimes very low.  I would see this as a way in which we are shirking both our duty and our power, giving it, in fact, to other people.

   Now, I know that we hear, all the time, how "one vote" doesn't make any difference, that the politicians do not "listen" to the people who elected them.  There are just two points that should be made to that useless objection.  The first is that no one ever claimed that any one particular vote should have the privilege of being the decisive vote.  Yes, I am one of millions, but every single candidate who won an election did so by earning more of the "meaningless" votes that the other guy.  Votes certainly make a difference; in 2008 the Democrats won the White House, solidified their control of the House, and got a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate.  What happened in 2010?  They lost control of the House completely, lost their super-majority in the Senate, and were faced with the--for them--unpleasant task of either making serious, principled compromises with the Republicans, or seeing none of their agenda enacted.  This change was the result of millions of unimportant "one votes."

  We also hear the complaint that the parties aren't any different, that all politicians are the same, and so forth.  I wonder why I seem to hear that from the most uninformed segments of society, those who are either so far right, or so far left, that they do not have the mental apparatus to comprehend nuances?  They are either stupid or so egotistical that they think that it is THEIR opinion that should be the one that counts, that all candidates should reflect their own narrow perspectives.  I am 63 years old; I have not yet seen any candidate to whom I would grant an unqualified endorsement.  So what?  Only children say that if you won't play MY way I'll take my ball and go home! 

That's Just the Way I Am!

   “That’s just the way I am!”  How many times have we heard that when someone we know or have met tries to justify acting in a way that is thoroughly obnoxious and unacceptable?  We might here this variation: “That’s the way I was brought up” or something similar.  We are supposed to accept this person’s behavior, no matter how much it violates social norms, because we should presume that he or she cannot help but act this way.  After all, we would not criticize someone with a disability because he could not do something with the same ease as a person without the disability, would we?  We have an obligation, we are told, to be non-judgmental and accept this person, warts and all, because it is a part of his genetic or environmental make-up. 

   Do we really have such an obligation?  More importantly, are we merely the captive puppets of our genetic or our environmental heritage?  To what extent, if any, are we free to modify our attitudes and behavior?  These questions go to the heart of our social order, to our very concept of right and wrong.  The notion of correction or punishment presumes that we are, at least at some level, responsible for our own behavior.  So, for that matter, does the belief that the object of the justice system should be reform or rehabilitation.  If a person is responsible for his actions, then he can change.  If he can change, then he is responsible.  At some level all of us believe that people are responsible for what they do.  We may talk about how we should consider mitigating circumstances and so forth, but that is usually when we have no personal interest in the behavior in question.  It usually becomes a completely different matter when we are the object of some objectionable behavior.

   A pundit once described a conservative as a liberal who has been mugged, and there is some real truth to this observation.  It is, according to the implication, one thing to express an opinion about criminal behavior when we are only disinterested observers.  It can matter much more to us when we are the victims, and it usually does.  We might read in the newspaper about a young man who has robbed a convenience store.  If he is from a poor home, or was raised by a single mother, or fits into one of any number of politically correct categories, you can be sure that he will have many people who will come to his defense because of these circumstances.  They may not argue that he should be acquitted entirely because of them—although some will—but they will insist that the courts consider them when it comes to the matter of punishment.

   Watch what happens, however, when this same fountain of compassion and understanding becomes the victim of a crime.  Now, everything is different.  Now, we must uphold the law.  Now, the criminal must be punished!  This is natural because we all really do, beneath it all, believe that we are responsible for what we say and do.  When I become the victim instead of being an observer, that elemental feeling comes out.  Here is a common example of this phenomenon.  In many African-American communities, the people have no trust or confidence in the agents of law enforcement.  This may stem from any number of reasons, but it is nonetheless true.  Many commentators and pundits have complained about the fact that the penalties for the sale or possession of powder cocaine are less that those for the same offenses involving crack cocaine.  There should be no surprise here: powder cocaine tends to be used by whites, and crack by African-Americans.  A disinterested observer might feel justified in labeling this as just another example discriminatory law enforcement.  Is it mere coincidence that the crime more likely to be committed by African-Americans carries a harsher penalty than the similar crime more likely to be committed by whites?

   Here is the surprise.  The penalties for both forms of cocaine used to be the same, but the demand for harsher penalties came, not from people in law enforcement, or from the white community, but from people in the African-American communities that were being ravaged by crack use.  Powder cocaine was far too expensive to be in common use among members of the African-American community, which tends to be poorer than the average white community.  However, the crystal form of the drug delivered a more powerful reaction for much less money, and its social effects were horrendous.  The members of the community demanded action and the government responded.  Was the response right or wrong?  For the purpose of this essay that question is completely irrelevant.  What matters is this: when its interests were involved, the African-American community became as much a law and order community as any suburban white community.  We see two significant phenomena here.  Those who demanded harsh penalties for crack use were making a 180 degree shift in their attitude towards law enforcement.  They also showed that, at least on this issue, they were unwilling to accept any touchy-feely excuses for criminal behavior.

   So, we can all be put into situations where we demonstrate our belief that people are responsible for their actions, notwithstanding any mitigating factors.  However, to be honest we must ask one question.  Are we merely, when faced with matters that touch us personally, reverting to a more primitive emotion?  Perhaps our reactions when we are truly disinterested are more accurate.  After all, many times this is the case.  This may be true, but what is important is the underlying principle: we can, given sufficient encouragement, change our opinions and attitudes about different things.

   How so?  I’ll give you an example from my own life, one that I have used elsewhere.  I have always been terrified of heights, even to this day.  My wife and I owned a condominium apartment on the 10^th floor of our building.  I had to go out on to the balcony if I wanted to have a cigarette.  As long as I sat or stood away from the rail I was alright, but if I even thought about going near the edge, my knees would buckle.  I mean that literally; I could be sitting inside our unit and, if I just imagined leaning over the edge, my knees would get weak.  So, with this image clear in you mind, imagine this.  When I was at my ROTC summer camp, I was faced with this task.  We had to climb to the top of a fifty foot tower that had a metal cable stretched out over a rather deep creek.  The cable ran down to a ten foot pole at the other end.  From the top of the tower, we were required to grab a sliding bar and slide down the cable to the other end.  Ten feet before the end, we had to let go and drop into the water, while moving about 20 miles per hour.  If you didn’t let go, you would slam into the pole and be rather seriously injured.

   That was not all.  As soon as we were finished we had to jog over to a second tower.  This was on the edge of one side of the creek, and there was a matching tower on the other side.  Stretched between the two towers was a thick rope about twenty to twenty-five feet above the water.  We had to crawl out onto the rope, let go with one hand, salute, and ask permission to drop in the water.  When that was granted, we let go and dropped into the creek.  For someone with a previously debilitating fear of heights, these events looked like they would be almost as much fun as catching the bubonic plague.  In short, I was terrified of the prospect of having to complete these events.  What motivated me to do them was a conflicting emotion: pride.  I was about seven years older than most of the other ROTC cadets.  They had only completed their third year of college, while I was in graduate school.  In addition, I had already served three years in the Army, rising to the specialist equivalent of sergeant.  The cadre and the younger cadets expected me to set an example for them, and I was determined not to let them down.  So, I charged up the towers, all the while yelling with my best imitation of a Viking berserker.  To be honest, I think that I was trying to convince myself to go through with these events.  Anyway, I fooled the cadre and the other cadets; they were astounded to find out later just how scared I had been.  This is, however, the definition of courage, to do something in spite of your fear.  The point is that I was motivated by another emotion that was stronger than my fear, and it demonstrates that even deep-seated emotions can be overcome.

   This clearly means that we are not the prisoners of our past.  Here are two more personal examples.  My wife is from Guatemala; she was born and grew up there.  One of her parents was Asian, and the other was German.  She, however, is thoroughly Latina in her outlook and attitudes, because that was the common culture of her society.  After years in the United States, she took me to visit her family.  They told her that she had become too American!  She had, of course, absorbed much of American ways of living.  My own heritage is a mix of Scottish, English and Swedish, but except for my admiration of the English legal heritage, I don’t identify with any of those cultures.  My house looks like a Greek or Roman temple; as I write this I have votive candles burning to images of Apollo, the Lares and Penates, and Fortuna Primigenia.  As far as I know, I have no Greek or Italian ancestry, but I admire these cultures for the foundations they laid down for modern Western humanist civilization.

    It seems to me that, ultimately, we are what we want to be, not what we inherited through our genes or absorbed through our environment.  We become that which we admire, that which we want to emulate.  We see this phenomenon in cases of religious conversion.  Augustine was a libertine who had dabbled in Manichean religion and Neo-Platonist philosophy; he had refused any dealing with his mother’s Christianity.  After his conversion he became one of the most important figures in Christian theology, at least up until Thomas Aquinas.  This effect can be found in converts to many religions, not just Christianity.  We know of the case of Malcolm X, who turned from a criminal life when he joined the Nation of Islam.  Drug addicts have kicked their habits because they started worshipping Krishna.  These events are perfectly genuine; these converts truly internalize new values and beliefs.

   This does not imply, nor should the reader infer, that the objects of such religious devotion are real in any objective sense.  As a secular philosopher I would be skeptical of any such claims, but that is not what is important.  What matters is that the convert believes that the claims are real.  He or she could have decided to worship Marduk or the snake god of the Marsi people of pre-Roman Italy.  It is the sincerity of the conversion and the intensity of the belief that matter.  As long as the believer is sincere, the personality or behavior change required by his or her new faith will occur.  It is the motivation that matters, not the reality behind that motivation.

  This does not address the original issue, however.  Yes, our beliefs, actions and attitudes can change, given sufficient motivation, but to say that they can change is not the same as to say that they should be expected to change.  The ability to change does not imply the obligation to do so.  To clarify the issue, let’s create a hypothetical scenario.  Our protagonist, John, has an attitude that society owes him a comfortable standard of living. Furthermore, he tends to express this attitude in ways that interfere with holding a good job and making friends; he has “a chip on his shoulder.”  How did he come by this attitude?  That really doesn’t matter.  Perhaps he grew up in an upper class home where he could have the best of everything, and he has become so used to this that he thinks it is some kind of birthright.  His parents may have had to work for their prosperity, but since that is all he knows, he thinks of it as something he should just have.  Or, perhaps he grew up in a very poor family and has come to think that the larger society owes some kind of debt to him.  In his situation, it is clear that something is going to have to change; either John is going to have to adapt to the expectations of others, or they are going to have to adapt to him.

   Of course, there is a third option: nobody makes any changes, and John remains miserable.  Let’s assume that this is not an option, because John is not happy in his current state.  We may ask, why does he have any obligation to change his behavior?  Why does no one have to adapt to him?  If what I have argued previously is true, that we have no positive obligations to others unless we are in some sort of special, personal relationship, why is there this obligation on John’s part?  It is simply this: none of the rest of us—those who comprise the “general society” that John resents—have any positive obligations that would require us to alter our own attitudes towards John.  As long as we leave him alone in a kind of benign neglect—in short, as long as we do him no harm—we have fulfilled our only obligations.  We have no positive duties to alter our attitudes or expectations to suit his needs.  We can simply go about our daily lives as we wish, even if that action leaves him in the same rut he was in to begin with.

   So, if John does not want to remain miserable, and if we have no obligation to accommodate him, what is left but for him to make whatever changes to his attitude and behavior that are necessary to change his external situation?  Epictetus gave an example in his Discourses about a man who came to him complaining about how his brother was treating him; he asked Epictetus for his advice.  Epictetus replied that he could help the man behave properly towards his estranged brother, but there was nothing he could say to the man about changing the brother’s behavior.  For that, he replied, bring your brother to me, and I will speak with him.  As to his behavior, however, I have nothing to say to you.  In short, Epictetus was teaching, in true Stoic fashion, that while we control our own thoughts and behavior, we cannot control another’s behavior.  John can alter his own behavior and attitudes, but there is nothing he can do about the external world.  If there is something about his life that he does not like, it is up to John to make the necessary changes.

   In this example we have talked about a man whose personality, for whatever reason, contained a serious flaw.  Here is the politically incorrect ramification of this argument.  Suppose that John’s problem is not a personality flaw, but that he is from a different country and culture.  In this case John’s problem is that behavior that would have been totally acceptable in his own country is considered completely inappropriate in his new home.  Does this new circumstance make any difference in our conclusion?  I think that logic forces us to conclude that it does not do any such thing.  Let’s give the example some specific details.  John is now an American businessman working at his company’s office in Germany.  He speaks very little German, just enough to get by on the street.  He doesn’t think that he needs to, since they use English at the office since it is only a branch of an American firm.  He finds out, to his chagrin, that he has alienated some of his German neighbors, who think that he is rude.  What could have happened?

   Well, if we look at the German language, we will notice something interesting.  In English we have only one word for the second person pronoun, “you,” and we use it for all circumstances.  German, on the other hand, has two forms, “du” and “Sie.”  The first form is used with children, family members and very close personal friends.  “Sie” is used in all other circumstances.  In English we would say “you” when referring to our spouse, boss or total stranger.  In German, no one would ever use “du” when speaking to a boss or stranger.  It would be considered insulting, and inappropriately familiar.  German society is much more formal than American society, and the language reflects that formality.

   In John’s case, it turns out that he has been using the word “du” rather than “Sie” to his neighbors.  Furthermore, he has been behaving with typical American casualness, addressing his neighbors by their first name rather than has “Herr” or “Frau.”  This was, when I was there anyway, considered gauche.  So, what should our friend John do?  I think we all know that his neighbors are going to expect him to be the one who has to make any cultural adaptations.  They are not going to remake German society simply to make an American business executive happy.  It is simply the old saying, “When in Rome, do as the Romans.”  Again, it is going to be the responsibility of the individual to make any adjustments that have to be made.  This principle applies just as strongly to an immigrant to America as it does to an American who lives elsewhere.

   Here is an example of an event that happened several years ago in Washington, D.C.  A young man who was an immigrant from one of the Latin American countries was arrested for public intoxication and for resisting arrest.  The second charge was filed after he fought the policewoman who responded to the complaint.  After the arrest, some members of the community tried to excuse the young man’s actions.  First, they defended his conduct on the grounds that drinking in front of one’s house—even in public—with one’s friends was not a serious matter in the young man’s home country.  Second, they complained that the police department had been “insensitive” in sending an African-American female to arrest him.  They should have sent a male officer, according to the protestors, because a young Hispanic male would have been humiliated to be arrested by a woman.

   It is quite clear that this young man, not the police force or any of the other agencies of government, is the one who was wrong, and he was wrong on two counts.  First, it may be true that drinking in public with his friends might have been acceptable behavior in his home country, or it might not be true.  Either way, that argument is meaningless.  He was not in his home country, he was in the capital of the United States of America, and different rules apply in different countries.  Second, in would be absurd to expect our government to reinforce prejudices just because they were acceptable overseas.  It was the young man’s responsibility to change his behavior because it was in his power to do so.  It was not in his power to change the rules here.

   We should note that we are always free to refuse to alter our behavior in order to fit in with others, but then we cannot expect to be listened to if we complain that we are being ostracized.  That would be as foolish as expecting to lose excess weight on a diet of cheeseburgers and french fries.  It would simply not happen.  It is not a matter of morality, but one of practicality.  If I am not willing to spend the time practicing, I will never learn to play the piano, at least much beyond “Chopsticks.”  If I do not exercise, I will never become much of an athlete.  It is a simple, practical matter of cause and effect.  If fitting in with others is my goal, then I must do what it takes to accomplish that goal.  This does not mean, however, that adapting to others is always the right thing to do.

   As a Stoic, I would caution the reader that popularity, or being liked, is never a worthy goal.  It might even be an immoral goal, depending upon the circumstances.  The Stoic goal is to achieve peace of mind by conforming one’s desires to nature, by desiring only those things that are under our control.  “Being liked by others” is simply not something that is within our control.  We can do what we can to be likeable, but that doesn’t mean that others will like us.  What if everyone in your neighborhood is a jerk?  We can certainly prefer to be liked rather than disliked.  If the gods came down to me and said, “It is in your hands.  You can be liked or disliked, with no changes or effort on your part.  Which do you prefer?”  Well, duh…What do you think I would choose?  The problem is that, last time I checked, the gods have not offered me that choice. 

   There are times and circumstances in which adapting to the local cultural norms would actually be immoral, not just futile.  If the local customs are in some way evil, then it would be a wrong act even to make the effort to fit in.  We must never forget that our highest values are to be faithful to what is true and to do what we see as right.  We should consider Socrates’ example.  He did not choose to “fit in” with all of the customs in Athens.  In fact, he chose instead to be loyal to what he saw as the truth, even though it cost him his life.  He could have chosen to blend in with the rest of the Athenian citizens, but if he had, who would have remembered him?  He was purple stripe on the toga praetexta, the mark of dignity, not the white of the bulk of the garment.

   The focus of this essay is not to encourage the reader to sacrifice his moral purpose in order to be popular.  That would be as immoral as it would be stupid.  It would be immoral because we should never sacrifice our values for transient gain.  It would be stupid because we do not control other peoples’ beliefs or opinions, so why compromise a goal that is within our power for one that is not?  We might choose to sacrifice our principles in order to become popular, only to find that not only did we not become popular, but now we can’t stand to look at ourselves in the mirror.  Having said that, we can certainly admit that when there are no moral issues involved, there is nothing at all wrong with wanting to be a good neighbor.  Much of what constitutes neighborliness has little or no real moral content; it is simply a matter of accepting and respecting local customs.  I am a native of Northern Virginia, a suburb of Washington D.C. that has become quite cosmopolitan.  I recently moved to a semi-rural area north of Atlanta, Georgia.  There are certainly some differences between life in these two areas, but none of them, at least as far as I can tell, involve any moral issues.  Life certainly is more casual here, but casualness is neither a vice nor a virtue.  That being the case, there is certainly no reason for me to try to avoid blending in as much as possible.

   For example, the first day we moved in I made a point of raking the yard and gathering up the leaves.  Our new house had been vacant for several months, so we wanted to get the yard looking as nice as we could.  We planted some flowers and two crepe myrtles.  We did this right away so that the neighbors could see that the new owners had every intention of being responsible, constructive members of our new community.  If there was any moral issue involved, it was that every member of a community should be productive and useful.  On the other hand, if we had moved to an area whose customs required that I violate one or more deeply held principles, then it would have been my duty to refuse to cooperate.  Suppose that I had moved here 60 years ago, and the local custom demanded that everyone who is eligible join the Ku Klux Klan.  That would have been an immoral act, and it would have been a right act to refuse to join.  However, that is certainly no longer the case.  As you could guess, this is a more religious region than Northern Virginia, at least in terms of church membership and attendance, but it is not some American version of Taliban Afghanistan.  We may have businesses that refuse to open on Sunday for religious reasons, but no one is forced to attend any church. 

   There are some obvious limits to accommodating local customs.  My accent gives me away every time I open my mouth.  I happen to think that Jeff Foxworthy is one of the funniest comedians in America—now I am even living in his home state—but I can guarantee you that I sound nothing like him.  If I were to say “y’all” instead of “you” it would sound phony.  It would sound so phony that it would probably come across as condescending.  I like country music, but I never wear a baseball cap.  I like to fish—even though I’m not that good at it—but forget hunting.  There is no way that I could pass as a native of Georgia, so it is better not even to try. 

   These are only surface differences; the conservative attitudes here still evoke a sense of patriotism and duty that are missing farther north, and I find these appealing.  Farther north you are likely to find people who seem to be ashamed of being American.  The people here seem prouder of being American, and they are more likely to share traditional values.  The important point is that I don’t expect anybody to make any adjustments for me.  I do expect to be left alone on those matters where we differ, but I have no right to expect people to adapt to my customs, no matter where I live.  I lived in Germany for four years during the time I was in the Army.  Even though we were there as a part of NATO, and defending Germany from the Soviet Union was a part of our mission, we were taught that we were expected to learn and respect German customs; they were not expected to learn ours.

   Obviously some solders were better at this than others.  We would have soldiers who would walk in a German Gasthaus and be told that the establishment was full, even though they could see a free table.  These soldiers would complain that the local merchants were discriminating against them, but they would be wrong.  Invariably, the table that they thought was “free” was the Stammtisch, a table reserved for regular customers.  One could only sit at this table by invitation, and this rule applied to Germans as much as it did Americans.  If the proprietor were, in fact, discriminating against some American soldiers because of race or religion, then the commander would have had the option of placing the establishment “off-limits.”  This would have meant that no military personnel would be permitted to patronize the business, and this was a threat that was often quite effective.  If, however, the soldiers had been turned away for a legitimate reason, such as rowdy behavior or if the Stammtisch was the only available space, then nothing would be done.  Actually, the soldiers would probably be counseled on their need to learn and understand the local customs!  Eventually most soldiers learned to respect the local practices, because there were really only two choices: adapt and enjoy one’s tour in Germany, or refuse to adapt and spend the entire time complaining about life overseas.

   In all of life this is really the ultimate choice, isn’t it?  The Stoic message has always been that our happiness is in our own hands.  If we are in a crowd, we can complain that everything is noise and commotion, or we can act as if we were in the middle of a celebration and enjoy the party.  If we are alone, we can complain that we have nothing to do, no one to talk to, or we can regard it as peace and solitude, and enjoy the opportunity to read and think.  In all our dealings with others we must react the same way.  As long as we do not have to compromise our ethical beliefs, we can adapt to the local mores and participate in the local life.  The option is to complain that “they” are strange, or backwards, or whatever, and live miserable, crabbed lives.

   It is really both simple and logical.  If we want others to accept us, we must be the ones who are willing to make the effort.  We will never have any control over the actions of others, especially of their opinions of us.  If we live our lives in accordance with our principles—assuming our principles are admirable—we may induce other people to respect us, but that does not mean that they will like us.  No matter what the reason that we may find ourselves alienated from our neighbors, whether that reason be our personality, our cultural heritage, or whatever, we must make the effort to be “likeable.”  If, in a given situation that is our desire, then we, not they, must make the effort.

      

      

        

The Role of Emotion in Drawing Conclusions

  When it comes to determining what is right or wrong, correct or incorrect, true or false, our emotions or feelings should play no role in the process.  There is a role for emotion, but not here.

  When solving a problem in mathematics, does it matter than you may or may not “like” the proposition that 2 + 2=4?  Of course not; your feelings are of no consequence.  Do your feelings matter in physics when we say that “For every action there is an equal but opposite reaction?”  Of course not; here again feelings are of no consequence.  If we observe that every time we drop a stone from our hand it falls to the ground, do the feelings of the observer matter?  Again, they do not, with this one possible exception: if the feelings are so strong that they cause the observer to falsify the data, then they matter, but only in a harmful way.  We must always test our conclusions by whatever data are available.  We must always follow the data wherever they may lead, whether to affirmation of a proposition, rejection, or the admission that we cannot make a conclusion one way or the other.

   Does this sound like Mr. Spock?  If it does, then we must go on to the next point.  Emotions certainly do play a role in our lives, but they should not determine what we affirm or deny, what we hold to be true or false.  They certainly can, and usually should, determine the depth of our commitment to a particular position or proposition, but they should never determine the position we end up taking on a given issue.  When we allow that to happen, we lead ourselves into a world of “wish fulfillment.”  We can find ourselves approving a proposition because we want it to be true, or denying a perfectly valid and correct position because we want it to be false.  Either way, we will have betrayed our potential as rational beings; to return to the chariot analogy I spoke of once before, we are allowing the horses to lead the chariot.    

Collective Entities do not really exist.

  The point in my book for which I have received the most criticism to date was my assertion that collective entities—groups-- have no real existence.   That is, they have no ontological status other than as descriptions, classifications, comparisons, outside of the realm of conversation.

  When I say this, people are quite surprised, since they assume that they do really exist.  Am I really saying that this particular group of people does not exist?  In the true sense yes, I am saying precisely that.  The individuals who make up the group exist, but not the group itself.  It is nothing more than a mathematical set, with the individuals being the members of that set. 

   Suppose you walk into this room and see a pile 10 pennies here on the desk in front of me.  Does that group exist?  No; it only exists as the individuals pennies.  Can you show me the group apart from showing me the individual pennies that comprise the group?  No, you cannot.  In fact, I may not even have intended to create a pile of 10 pennies: it might simply be a pile of 10 pennies that were left over when I was trying to retrieve the dimes and nickels in my pocket!  The point I make here is that it is the observers, through our perception and our intent, who create the groups most of the time.

  Furthermore, groups are artificial, in that they do not exist in nature; our perception alone creates them.  We create them by making distinctions among larger possible collections, and different observers may make different distinctions.  To take an example from ancient history, most Romans made few distinctions among the Gauls.  Gauls were the enemy of Rome, and all Gauls were, ultimately, enemies.  Julius Caesar, on the other hand—perhaps because he spoke some of their languages—knew that they were not a united people, and that he could use their rivalries to cement Roman power over them.  In fact, even the Gauls themselves did not think of themselves as one people, and argued over who was, in fact, a Gaul.  Did the term include the Belgae, for example, a half-Celtic, half German, collection of people?

We do this all the time; look at the tendency to assume monolithic blocs of voters that prove to be illusive come election day.  What is a “Hispanic?” Is it someone who has a Spanish sounding name, or whose speaks Spanish,  or whose parents spoke Spanish, or whose ancestors once came from Spain/Portugal, or what?  I have a relative in Guatemala by marriage who carries a Chinese surname, looks completely Asian, but who clearly thought of himself as Guatemalan; is he also Hispanic, or not?  Who decides?

This may all sound academic, but it has a social and legal relevance.  If the group does not really exist, but is just a subjective definition on the part of some people in a given society, that “entity” can have no rights, no responsibilities, since it no more exists than the invisible Pink Unicorn.  All social philosophy must begin and end with discrete individuals, except when we are using a verbal shortcut in casual conversation.  Pick any social group you choose, say, in this case, African-American Women.  Does this include women whose descendents left Africa at any time, or only as a result of the slave trade?  Does it include women who may appear dark skinned but have one parent who is Caucasian?    Can you show me the group without showing me the individuals?  The answer is no, you cannot.  We may speak of a mob rioting and destroying property, but that is not correct.  Only individuals think, only individuals act.  The members of a “group” might, and sometimes do, act together, but it is still a collection of individual actions.  The responsibility for an action still resides with the individual, not the “group.”    

Is the Stoic Life a Passive One?

   I have had people criticize the Stoic way of life by saying that it seems that is that it is essentially passive.  Many critics have thought that if we are taught not to desire any external objects that life will lose its challenge.  I must admit that there would seem to be an element of truth to this observation.  Without the desire for fame and glory, would Alexander the Great have conquered his empire?  Would any of the great explorers have accomplished anything had it not been for the desire for fame and wealth?  The great captains of industry, the most successful military commanders, and probably many of our best scientists are often motivated by goals that Stoics would dismiss as improper.  If the majority, or even the “best and brightest,” adopted the Stoic way of life, isn’t it likely that society would stagnate?  The Stoic life may be one of peace and tranquility, but is it the peace of inactivity and withdrawal?

   This is, of course, a totally inaccurate picture of the Stoic life.  Some of the misunderstanding comes from its similarities to early Buddhism.  Buddhism, however, teaches its followers to renounce all desire.  This is the only way to end the cycle of death and rebirth.  In its earliest forms, only those who became monks or nuns could expect to achieve enlightenment, because only they could renounce all forms of desire.  A family life is not compatible with the goal to completely eliminate all desire.  While there are religious rules for the layman in society, the best that most men or women can hope for is to be reborn as a monk or nun in the next life.

   Stoic teaching is quite different in several important ways.  There is nothing otherworldly about the Stoic ideal.  Stoic teachers paid little attention to the afterlife, focusing instead on happiness and duty in this life.  For us, happiness is to be found in the knowledge that we can always achieve our goals, because we have chosen goals that are within our control.  No one can prevent me from affirming a true statement, from denying a false one, or from following my moral purpose.  Results might be outside of my control, but efforts are not.   I do admit that, sometimes, Epictetus does come off as a little fatalistic; he advises people to avoid public office, saying it is not worth the trouble.  Of course, he lived in a time when the Empire was ruled by a despot.  Sure, sometimes a beneficent one, sometimes an evil one.  Every Emperor, though, was a tyrant, and the only way to get ahead in public life was to curry favor with the tyrant or with his toadies.

   We get a completely different picture when we read the works of men who lived in a free republic, however.  Cicero extolled the public servant who lived his principles.  In the world of Cicero or Cato, political life was still free, and the individual could make a difference, or, at least, could attempt to make a difference.

   How can this work in day to day life?  Well, I cannot guarantee that my family will be wealthy; that is beyond my control.  I can work hard and invest properly, but things can go wrong.  I can do my best be a responsible husband and father, to carry out those duties that come with those roles.  I am morally responsible for my actions, but not for the final results, because those are outside my control.  I am responsible for doing my best for my family, but not for how those efforts turn out.  I am wrong only if I fail to attempt to do what I should. 

   Look back at the story Epictetus relates of the woman who sent packages to her exiled friend.  Her friend never received them because the Emperor’s soldiers took them, but was the effort really wasted?  What did this woman really accomplish?  The most important thing is that she did the right thing in trying to help her friend.  Too many of us would take the easy way out and decide that we should not waste the money and effort.  However, we know that we would be simply rationalizing a moral failure.  If this woman ever had the opportunity to meet her friend later, she could state truthfully that she had done the right thing.  What could she say if she had decided that the effort was wasted?  “Oh, sorry, but I gave up on you?”  Even if they never met again, the woman could look herself in the mirror without any self-reproach.  In this case it is certainly true that concern about results would more likely lead to inaction than concern over actions.

   There is another way in which the Stoic emphasis on efforts helps us live an active rather than passive life.   Since it is actions, not results that matter, I have NO excuse for not acting, ever.  Not every decision we will make is a moral one, of course.  Do I want baked potatoes or mashed potatoes with dinner?  Do I want maple syrup or strawberry syrup with my pancakes?  Who cares?  So what? 

BUT…many decisions we make do have moral consequences, and these impel us to act.  It is not enough to say that I am but one person, what can I do?  You can do whatever is at hand at the time, can’t you?  

Why are We Here--any reason?

I thought that it might be a good idea to take some time to address some of the critiques of the Neo-Stoic ideal I discussed in my book, Meaning in a Hostile World.  The one I will address in this article says that my approach, like that of any naturalist philosophy, fails to account for our existence.

What do I mean?  In other words, it does not address the issue of why we are here—as distinct from how we got here—or even why the universe exists.  This is a natural criticism, one that should be expected, and one that we can blame, ironically, on one of the greatest philosophers of the western world—Aristotle.

How so?  He said that there were four categories of causes: the material cause, efficient cause, formal cause, and the ultimate or Final cause.  He concluded this from looking at common artifacts and realizing that each could be described in these categories.  Take a simple three legged stool: the material cause would be the wicker, the wood, and the nails or glue, the “stuff” it takes to make it.  The efficient cause would be the labor to cut and assemble the parts.  The formal cause would be the plant behind the stool, and the ultimate or Final Cause would be the reason for making it.  Did you make it to use yourself, or to sell to another?  Whatever the answer is, that would be the Final Cause in this case.

This works well, of course, with artifacts; they are made by people—and at least  chimps, I admit—for specific functions.  The problem is that this reasoning may not—and, of course, I think does not—apply to natural objects.  An igneous rock may have a material cause—the lava or magma from which it forms—and an efficient cause, the eruption and subsequent cooling, but does it have a formal cause and a final cause? Is it even an artifact at all, or is “artifact” a word that applies only to human made objects?  The burden of proof, of course, would be on those who insist that every object is, in fact, an artifact.

Because our own actions are usually purposeful, and that of animals is often, or at least seem to be, purposeful, primitive people often assumed that nature itself was purposeful.  Do the plants grow well because it rains, or does it rain SO THAT the plants will grow?  The latter was the assumption throughout much of human history.

Hence, we often attribute purposeful actions to nature, and can assume that everything has a cause in the sense of having a purpose.  But, there is no reason to make that assumption, is there?  We cannot explain why the universe is here, because the question is illegitimate.  Of course, there will always be people who ask the question, but children also ask “why” to everything, and insist that the question simply MUST have an answer.  Adults know better; some questions don’t have answers, at least easy ones, and we have to be willing to say so.

The Purpose of Philosophy

Over the centuries, the purpose of philosophy has changed, and I think the change has not been for the better.  The Hellenic and Roman cultures, philosophy was intended as a guide to life, to living a meaningful existence.  It was not, at least in intent, an academic exercise--although of course there were those frauds for whom the teaching of philosophy was just another way to make a living, as there will be in any age or culture.

In our world, philosophy is coming to mean analytic philosophy, but that is only a small part of its function.  Of course we have to analyze events, experiences and so forth, but we should do so with the intent of creating a meaningful whole, a coherent view of the world.  This does not mean that we should create fantasy worlds ala Plotinus or Porphyry, but it does mean that it should provide a reasonable guide to how to live.  It must address the significant events in peoples' lives, such as disappointment, the grief over the loss of a loved on, and so on.  If it does this it can attract the interest and devotion of the educated populace that wants a rational guide to life, and not surrender the field to superstition.